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Chinese military and the Taiwan Strait – Update up to 17/03/2024

The files we follow: China in the Indo-Pacific; Chinese military and Taiwan Strait; Chinese economic strategies and tendencies ; China and Eastern Europe…

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– “Maritime Security Belt-2024” trilateral exercise

From March 11 to 15, China, Russia and Iran organized the 4th edition of their joint maritime exercise, entitled “Maritime Security Belt-2024” (“安全纽带-2024”). For this exercise, the Chinese side mobilized three vessels belonging to the 45th anti-piracy mission deployed in the Gulf of Aden, just relieved by the 46th escort formation.

With the theme of securing maritime transport, the exercise took place in the Gulf of Oman – an area regularly targeted by attacks at sea since 2019 – after regrouping at the Iranian port of Chabahar. It consisted of a theoretical shore phase, a practical naval phase and a synthesis phase. The practical exercises involved firing at sea, as well as scenario-based rescue of hijacked or damaged vessels.

The “Maritime Security Belt” exercise was initiated in December 2019, a few months after Tehran’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal. The latest edition of the “Maritime Security Belt” exercise does not impress in terms of its scale – around ten ships were involved in total – but is notable for its novelty: representatives of naval forces from South Africa, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Oman and Azerbaijan have joined the edition as observers.

Observer status has a very limited impact on the interoperability of the participating armies. But this act of representation is doubly revealing, both of the deepening rift between the West and a non-homogeneous entity – the “Global South” – and of the strengthening of China’s aura of power and credibility. The latter is increasingly emerging as one of the leaders – if not the most influential leader – of this new global pole.

– Anouncement of China’s 2024 defense budget

As the “Two Sessions” (1) held from March 4 to 12 revealed the budget forecasts for 2024 unfolded, budgetary forecasts for 2024 were announced: defense budget  officially amounts to 1665 billion RMB (231.4 billion US$), or 1.6% of national GDP, up 7.2% on the previous year.

A study of successive annual budget votes shows that the government’s financial allocation to defense has more than doubled since 2015. But taking only these public figures into account provides only a partial view of China’s military spending: some funding may be provided through other channels – subsidies distributed by the Ministry of Science and Innovation, whose budget increased by 2% this year, for example – or exceed forecasts. It is interesting to note, moreover, that the impact” of the increase on purchasing power is not the same in every economy (2).

The investment guidelines for 2024 were set out in a speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 5: priority is given to innovation and “future-oriented industries”. China’s efforts to continue moving up the industrial ladder are reflected, in the military field, by the development of new ranges of weaponry such as drones and electronic equipment (3). In the same vein, China’s MINDEF has announced plans to build a fourth aircraft carrier – a project whose imminence is questionable, given that construction of the third vessel of this type, the Fujian aircraft carrier, has not yet been completed.

– Sino-Maldivian security agreement

On Monday March 4, Maldivian MINDEF Mohamed Ghassan Maumoon and Zhang Baoqun, vice-director of the China International Military Cooperation Bureau, jointly ratified a security agreement on “China’s provision of military assistance gratis” to the Maldives.

The signing follows the visit of Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu from January 8 to 12. Elected last September following an anti-India campaign, Mohamed Muizzu is striving to counterbalance his state’s dependence on New Delhi by forging closer ties with China. On January 14, in the wake of his visit to Beijing, he announced that he would be requesting the departure of Indian military personnel on his soil. These 89 soldiers, initially deployed to operate 3 reconnaissance aircraft supplied by India to the Maldives, must have left the territory by May 10. They will be replaced by civilian personnel, also of Indian nationality.

Although the text of the agreement specifies that “normal cooperation between China and the Maldives does not target […] any third party“, this Sino-Maldivian rapprochement appears to be a major milestone in the Sino-Indian competition for influence. The location of the Maldives archipelago, a few hundred kilometers south of the commercial shipping lanes crossing the Indian Ocean, is strategic for Beijing, which is striving to secure these routes. The potential creation of a Chinese outpost on one of the Maldivian islands would complete the “necklace” of landing points lining the area, built by China through the construction of ports at its regional partners (Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh).

(1) “Two sessions” (两会 Lianghui): refers to the simultaneous holding of two national parliamentary congresses – those of the National People’s Congress (人民大会 – NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (全国委员会 – CPPCC). Held each year in March, these congresses provide an opportunity to review the past year’s social and economic performance, approve draft legislation, and determine development guidelines for the coming year. It is also during the Two Sessions that the President of the PRC is elected every five years.

(2) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that by 2022 Chinese defense spending, announced at US$230 million, had actually risen to US$292 million. Furthermore, rectifications in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), an index that offers comparability between two economies (the same sum of money does not confer the same purchasing capacity from one country to another), bring the estimate to US$476 million – or 59% of the US defense budget.

(3) Efforts honored by the official CCTV television channel which, while the Two Sessions were taking place, broadcast a report on the latest generation of the “Skyhawk” drone (天鹰 Tianying).

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