The files we follow: Iran’s relations with its neighbouring countries, Iran and the BRICS.
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A Pragmatic Alliance?
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, stated on 8 December 2024, “We will spare no effort to help establish security and stability in Syria, and to this end, we will continue consultations with all influential parties, especially in the region,” emphasizing Iran’s desire to maintain ties between the two countries.
On 11 December 2024, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei asserted that, while Turkey played a pivotal role in supporting the insurgency, the main conspirators behind the scenes are the U.S. and Israel.
With Bashar al-Assad’s regime overthrown after a less-than two-week offensive led by the Sunni Islamist HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost a close strategic ally and the only other state member of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”.
Initially, the Islamic Republic had little in common with the Ba’athist-rooted secular Assad regime, even as Assad’s governance shifted from secularism to sectarian pragmatic and authoritarian survival strategies, emphasizing its Alawite and Arab nationalist identity. Syrian Alawism diverges significantly in beliefs and practices from Iranian mainstream Shi’ism; however, both countries share a historical rooted narrative of persecution by Sunni-majority powers and a sense of marginalization in their identity. Syria’s alignment with Iran illustrates that ideological conformity, such as Hezbollah’s alignment with the Islamic Republic, is not a sine qua non for receiving Iranian support. Instead, Iran’s approach appears to be driven more by pragmatism and realism than by strict ideological considerations.
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