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Iranian foreign policy – Update as of 14/09/2024

The files we follow:  Iranian foreign policy, Iranian homeland security

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On September 12, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, travelled to St Petersburg to meet the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. The meeting took place against a backdrop of preparations for the 16th BRICS summit, to be held in Kazan from October 22 to 24. The heads of national security of the participating states also met to finalize preparations for next month’s summit. The Russian President reaffirmed Russia’s support and cooperation with Iran, and plans to receive President Masoud Pezeshkian to sign a new comprehensive cooperation agreement between the two states. According to the Islamic Republic’s news agency, he also pointed out that the volume of trade between Iran and Russia had increased by “10% in the first six months of 2024”, and that the North-South corridor remained at the heart of this bilateral relationship. The Iranian delegation also met Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko the following day in Minsk.

The Russian-Iranian agreement that gave birth to this 7,200km rail and ship trade route was signed in 2017 by the transport ministers of both countries, but also of India, where the final destination of this axis is located, the port of Nhava Sheva or officially called Jawaharlal Nehru. More recently, in May 2023, former Iranian president Ebrahim Raissi and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin signed an agreement for the construction of a 164km railroad line linking the city of Astara on the Azerbaijani border with the city of Rasht on the Caspian Sea. On the occasion of this agreement, the Russian president stated that goods deliveries would take around 10 days between Bombay and Saint Petersburg, compared with 30 to 45 days using traditional trade routes such as the Suez Canal. Against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Russian president seems intent on drawing attention to another, more laudatory theme of Russian foreign policy, namely its commercial presence in the Caucasus.

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