The files we follow : Influence diplomacies in Central Asia; ; Security Policies Issues in Central Asia, Territorial conflicts in Central Asia
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On December 8, the world awoke in shock at news of the Syrian dictator’s escape and the collapse of an authoritarian, dynastic regime that had ruled the country with an iron fist for over 50 years. The lightning offensive led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham coalition overwhelmed the regime’s soldiers, who, worn down by 13 years of civil war and several months without pay, offered little or no resistance. Thus, a new authority has emerged, and a government has been appointed by the military command of the jihadist group, led by Ahmed Al-Charaa, formerly known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Joulani.
While Syria’s future remains highly uncertain, the region looks on incredulously as a second Middle Eastern country falls to radical Islamists, following Afghanistan in 2021. This upheaval raises fears of new waves of terrorism around the world.
Among the countries expressing acute concerns about their internal security are those of Central Asia. The presence of Central Asian fighters in Syria is nothing new. Indeed, the five countries of the region rank among the largest contributors of foreign fighters to the armed groups and jihadist militias of the Middle East. Several factors explain the prominence of Central Asia in Middle Eastern jihadism.
Tajikistan Under the Sway of a Clan
While the region as a whole remains far from embracing liberal democracy, Tajikistan is likely the most distant from such a model. It is the only Central Asian country that has had just one President since independence in 1991: Emomali Rakhmon. In practice, the entire country is ruled by one man—indeed, by a single clan. The Rakhmon family’s grip on the country’s institutions and major enterprises has steadily tightened. The President’s four daughters share strategic positions both in the private sector and in government institutions: Zarina heads the country’s leading bank (Orienbok), while Ozoda oversees the Presidential Administration. Moreover, the president’s son, Rustam Rakhmon, who had been mayor of Dushanbe (the capital), was given the position of President of the Senate—effectively the second-highest office in the country, right behind his father.
Over the past few years, laws have been enforced to silence opposition voices, whether from political parties or civil society. In 2009, a law on religion required the registration of all religious groups and imposed new obligations on them. In 2015, an attempt by the Islamic Party—Tajikistan’s main opposition party—to destabilize the regime led to its ban, and since then, its members have been harshly repressed. According to some observers, these repressive policies are contributing to radicalization in Tajik society, which no longer has any avenue for expressing discontent.
This urgent need for a platform to be heard is exacerbated by the country’s dire economic and social situation. Tajikistan is among those that contributed the most foreign fighters to the Islamic State. According to the Tajik analyst Faridoun Hadizadeh, as cited by the outlet Novastan, at the height of the war, 5,000 Central Asian citizens—women and children included—joined Daesh, of whom 2,000 were Tajiks. Tajikistan is by far the least developed country in Central Asia (with a GDP of just 8 billion dollars in 2019). In 2022, it ranked 126th globally in the Human Development Index, trailing well behind Iran (78th), Libya (92nd), and just ahead of Iraq (128th). Hampered by the lack of development, unemployment, and endemic corruption, young people leave to find work in Russia. The economy’s dependence on money sent home by migrants is so great that these remittances account for 33% of Tajikistan’s GDP (and in 2014, the year the Islamic State’s caliphate was proclaimed, they accounted for half). But Tajik migrants frequently encounter severe difficulties integrating into Russian society, where they face discrimination, scorn, and social isolation. Religion becomes a refuge—making them targets for “internet imams,” a recruitment tactic the Islamic State has perfected. According to Tajik counter-extremism expert Roustam Azizi, migration itself is not the cause of radicalization; rather, it creates a context in which individuals, far from family and emotionally vulnerable, are most susceptible. A study conducted by two instructors at the Tajik Interior Ministry Academy (since removed from publication) showed that 85% of Tajiks who joined extremist organizations were recruited while working in Russia.
The Transfer of Military Expertise from National Armies to Jihadist Organizations
Central Asian fighters are acknowledged for their combativeness and operational skills. Indeed, whereas al-Qaeda and the traditional offshoots of the Islamic State have accustomed the world to guerrilla-style tactics, Central Asian fighters have demonstrated a higher level of technical proficiency. Where do these abilities come from? The defection of several former high-ranking officers—who first served in the Soviet Red Army and later in the newly formed national armies—has provided operational and logistical expertise that jihadist groups previously lacked. One of the Islamic State’s most notable successes in recruitment was gaining a former Tajik special forces colonel, Gulmurod Khalimov. Partly trained in the United States, he joined the caliphate in 2015 as its “Minister of War.” Killed in an airstrike in Mosul in 2017, he was the Islamic State’s second-in-command, behind the self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. According to David Gaüzere, Baghdadi had assembled a “praetorian guard” of Russian-speaking fighters. After Baghdadi’s death in 2019, leadership passed to a Turkmen national—Amir Mohamad Abdel Rahman al-Maoula al-Salbi—another Central Asian, and one of the few non-Arabs to occupy a senior position within the organization.
The military effectiveness of fighters from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan also helps explain the rapid success of the HTS coalition’s offensive. Included in the coalition led by Damascus’s new strongman is the militia Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari. Largely composed of Uzbeks, it took part in the uprising against the Baathist regime alongside the al-Nusra Front, affiliated with al-Qaeda. In a December 3, 2024 video shot near a Christian monastery in northern Syria, a Tajik-speaking man claims to have seized territory from the “infidels.” In total, more than 374 Tajik fighters have been identified in the Idlib region alone, the stronghold of the HTS group.