The files we follow: Chinese Defence and Taiwan Strait; China-Southeast Asia relations; China and the Middle East; Chinese economic strategies and tendencies; China and the BRICS…
GET YOUR SUBSCRIPTION FOR FREE!
Dear EurasiaPeace readers,
In the run-up to the Chinese New Year festivities on January 29, we bring you a special format: reading geopolitical news in the light of this pivotal period. Here you’ll find a short summary of the evolution of Sino-Thai relations in the context of the proliferation of scam centers, as well as the accelerating recomposition of forces in Myanmar and its potential impact on China.
Chinese New Year tourism in Thailand hampered by proliferation of organized crime
Thailand is usually a popular destination for Chinese nationals on their rare extended vacations. But the country’s tourist appeal, already hit by the release of the film “No more bets” in Chinese cinemas in 2023, suffered this month from the scandal of the kidnapping of Chinese actor Wang Xing, lured to the Myanmar-Thailand border and sent to a scam center in early January 2025.
China and Thailand are working, as part of a quadrilateral partnership with Laos and Myanmar, to combat virtual lottery, online scams and human trafficking on their territories. However, the effectiveness of these initiatives is limited by the Burmese junta’s unwillingness to combat what amounts to an economic windfall for it, and by the ongoing instability in its territory.
In the run-up to Chinese New Year, a ceasefire signing and limited political gain for China
On January 17, 2024, representatives of Myanmar’s ruling junta and the Burmese ethnic armed group MNDAA signed a ceasefire agreement in Kunming, southern China. The location of this meeting highlights Chinese intermediation in this process, but it is not the only factor.
In fact, China is exerting considerable pressure on the MNDAA and other armed groups that have made significant advances against the junta in Shan State, in northern Myanmar. Seeing its economic interests threatened – notably its access to rare-earth deposits – but also fearing instability spilling over into its own territory – at a time when Myanmar’s Chinese border region, Yunnan, is already experiencing development difficulties and is heavily dependent on pipelines passing through Burmese territory – China has tried to dissuade the SAGs from inflicting further losses on the junta.
China’s many political U-turns on the Biman issue
The Burmese junta, led by Min Aung Hlain since the 2021 coup d’état, is currently in a very poor position: it now controls just 21% of Myanmar’s territory. This decline has been meteoric and continuous since October 2023, when 3 ethnic armed groups joined forces to launch the ambitious “Operation 1027”.
Like other Asian states and beyond, China has not been spared the scourge of human trafficking and online scams operating from Myanmar and, more recently, Cambodia. Noting that the junta was taking no real action against the scam centers, Beijing withdrew its unwavering support for its ally, offering it to Operation 1027.
But the effectiveness of the operation exceeded China’s expectations. Seeing the junta weakened, Beijing made another U-turn in the spring of 2024 and tried to persuade the Shan State SAG to stop fighting. In the face of their resistance, China applied pressure tactics – cutting off water, food and internet supplies. Finally, the main SAG in northern Myanmar, the MNDAA, gave in to Chinese pressure after its leader was arrested in China in November 2024.
Having sought a middle way to reconcile its interests with those of the junta, China risks losing on several fronts
China’s fickleness will not be without consequences. The Burmese junta has never been so close to disintegration as it was after the major rebel conquests of December 2024, notably that of the stronghold town of Lashio in northeastern Myanmar.
But what happens if the junta falls? Once close to the MNDAA armed group, many of whose members have Chinese origins, Beijing has alienated the rebel group holding territory on its border through its pressure; its desperate support for the junta government is also generating widespread resentment towards it among the Burmese population and diaspora.
In the event of the emergence of a collection of states collaborating or vying for power in Myanmar, China will certainly be hard-pressed to find a solid ally in this shattered territory on its southern border. This detestable setback in Myanmar will certainly dissuade Beijing from versatility in the future, and encourage it to stick to its fundamental line in both domestic and foreign policy: stability and consistency above all else.